This paper finds that the stock of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) is subject to diminishing returns measured in terms of foreign direct investment flows. Diminishing returns are more pronounced among country-pairs that have not signed bilateral investment treaties but have their own BIT network than among country-pairs with their own bilateral investment treaties. For a given country's BIT network, a multinational enterprise finds more value in investing where a bilateral treaty is in place. This may suggest either stronger property-rights protection or greater latitude to use the host country as an export platform. Our subsidiary finding is that an index of a country's BIT network diversity appears to be a plausible explanation of the limiting force underlying the diminishing returns of the stock of BITs in a world where there is a mix between horizontally and vertically integrated multinational enterprises.
Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is now as much a central part of new regionalism as preferential trade agreements (PTAs) were in old regionalism (Ethier, 2001) .
1 Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) were designed to facilitate FDI flows from countries with abundant capital and skilled labor to developing countries. BITs have proliferated over the past fifty years, and especially in the past two decades, despite the difficulty of creating a multilateral FDI regime (Elkins et al., 2006) . From 1989 to 2007 there has been a seven-fold increase in BITs (from 385 to 2,600). At the end of 2007, 22 countries had in place more than 50 BITs. 2 Governments now compete to attract FDI by offering a variety of incentives to investors (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) .
The theoretical literature on the relationship between trade and FDI is variegated. FDI can move between similar (i.e., similarly endowed) countries, suggesting a channel of horizontal FDI (Markusen, 1984) , or between dissimilar countries, suggesting a channel of vertical FDI (Helpman, 1984) , or a mixture of the two, suggesting both horizontal and vertical FDI channels (Markusen and Maskus, 2002) . Horizontal FDI implies substitution between trade and FDI: a fall in trade costs should induce a marginal switch from FDI to trade. Yet, the evidence shows that FDI has been growing while trade costs have fallen. This complementarity between exports and FDI has been explained in either of two ways (Neary, 2009 ). The first is that intra-bloc liberalization programs have encouraged the establishment of export platforms aimed at serving the entire bloc (e.g., Ireland in the European Union). The second is that declining trade costs have provided incentives of lower-cost multinational enterprises (MNEs) to acquire foreign higher-cost MNEs.
Quite independently of the theoretical view, BITs can reduce the expected cost of investing abroad and encourage FDI flows (Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004) . To be sure, there are studies, however, that have questioned the role of BITs in attracting FDI, claiming that the latter depends more on the political and economic system of the host country (Sornarajah, 1986 ) and on differences in cultural, political, and business practices between home and host and countries (Hoekman and Saggi, 2000) than on the creation of a formal legal structure. On balance, however, the literature has concluded that BITs exert a positive effect on FDI flows, at least from a static viewpoint.
This paper has two objectives. The first is to go beyond the static effects of BITs and empirically estimate the marginal effects of the stock of BITs on FDI flows. We find that BITs have marginal diminishing returns measured in terms of investment flows. The second is to provide a plausible explanation for this finding. We key on the country's BIT network diversity as a limiting factor underlying our main finding. We test the underlying hypothesis with a gravity equation on a large panel dataset covering inward FDI flows to 30 OECD countries and 118 non-OECD countries from 30 OECD countries over the 1980-2005 period. The gravity equation employs country-fixed, year-fixed, and country-pair random effects to overcome problems associated with a conventional gravity equation (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007) . We also check for the robustness of our findings in two alternative ways: with a country-fixed effect specification (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) and a lagged variables specification (Frankel, 1997) to control for potential distortions due to sample self-selection and endogeneity of explanatory variables.
Finally, we address the issue of zero values in the FDI data by employing a zero-inflated Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator (PPML; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 ) and a zeroinflated negative binomial pseudo maximum likelihood regression (NBPML; Burger et al., 2009 ).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and empirical literature on the pattern of FDI and BIT and links it explicitly to the literature on trade creation and trade diversion. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 4 discusses salient findings and provides robustness checks. Section 5 deals with BIT network diversity as a plausible limiting factor to the diminishing returns of the stock of BITss. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment
Historically, FDI has been subject to contractual and political hazards. Before the introduction of BITs, few credible mechanisms existed for the treatment of foreign investment. Customary international law, shortly the "Hull Rule," held that "no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore" (Elkins et al., 2006, 813) . BITs, on the other hand, were an important step in guaranteeing foreign investors fair and equitable, non-discriminatory, most-favored-nation and national treatment; offering legal protection of both physical and intellectual property rights under international law and investment guarantees, including expropriation, rules of compensation, and transfer of funds; and providing access to international means of dispute resolution (Guzman, 1998; UNCTAD, 2000; Desbordes and Vicard, 2009 Neumayer and Spess, 2005; Egger and Merlo, 2007; Busse et al., 2010) , no study has yet looked at the benefits of incremental BITs on country-pair FDI flows. In contrast, the literature on international trade and PTAs is rich with works dealing with the benefits and costs accruing to member and non-member countries from an expansion of PTAs, starting with Viner's (1950) classic work on trade creation and trade diversion and Bhagwati's (1991) extension of building vs. stumbling blocs. 5 The present study applies the concept of trade creation and trade diversion due to PTAs to BITs in FDI.
The basic theoretical principle underlying a BIT is that it acts as a costly signal to foreign investors that a host country will honor the protection of property rights (Neumayer and Spess, 2005) . The payoff for the host country is a larger flow of inward FDI from the country with which the BIT has been signed. In a multi-country setting, however, one needs to consider the effect of global competition for FDI. Assume three countries, with home country x signing a BIT with two host countries, y and z. The impact of the x-y BIT on x-y FDI flow will depend, not only the x-y BIT, but also on the x-z BIT and y-z BIT. If the x-z BIT is more attractive than the x-y BIT, x can switch some FDI from y to z. The result is that an additional BIT may not have the intended positive effect on the x-y FDI flow. One can also look at the effects of global 4 International arbitration typically occurs through the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes or the UN Commission on International Trade Law (Elkins et al., 2006 There is also competition for funds between BIT and non-BIT countries. Other things the same, BIT countries should have larger FDI flows than non-BIT countries because of BIT's riskreduction benefits. But non-signatory countries could provide to the home country inputs that may not be available from non-signatory countries, such as an international supply chain network.
To the extent that such inputs are unobservable and cannot be accounted for, NBITs can be associated with lower rather than higher FDI flows.
In sum, BIT may increase or decrease bilateral FDI flows by either reducing the cost of investing abroad or by increasing competition in host countries and the opportunity costs of funds in home countries. Thus, BITs can generate both FDI creation and FDI diversion; the net effect of these two forces becomes an empirical issue.
Methodology and Data

Gravity Equation Specification
Our statistical models use the gravity equation, which has been widely used in bilateral trade studies (see Fratianni, 2009 for a review), as well as in bilateral FDI studies (e.g., Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Head and Ries, 2008; Desbordes and Vicard, 2009; Guiso et al., 2009; Busse et al., 2010 (2007); GDP and POP are gross domestic product and population, respectively; DIST is geographical distance between the country pair expressed in miles; CBORD is a dummy variable when the two countries have a common land border; CLANG is a dummy variable for a common language; COLR is a dummy variable for a shared colonial relationship; CURU is a dummy variable for a common currency; RTA is a dummy variable when the two countries are members of the same regional trade agreement;
ORT is the home country's FDI orientation; OPE is the host country's FDI openness ; BIT is a dummy variable for the existence of a bilateral investment treaty; and NBIT is the number (stock) of bilateral investment treaties; more on this below.
There are two important econometric issues that we have to consider in estimating Equation (1): multilateral resistance and zero-value observations (Fratianni et al., 2010) . On multilateral resistance, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue that bilateral trade (but it also applies to FDI) flows depend not only on what goes on between a given country-pair but also between the country-pair and the rest of the world: bilateral trade flows are determined in a general equilibrium framework. These authors derive a gravity equation that includes bilateral and multilateral trade costs. The latter are a function of bilateral trade costs, countries' income shares, countries' price levels, and factors unobservable to researchers. Just as importantly, they are jointly determined and their omission creates a bias in the estimated coefficients. Anderson and van Wincoop correct for this bias by estimating "n" non-linear equations. The procedure is very cumbersome and applicable when "n" is very small. Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) have proposed an alternative using time-varying fixed effects (FE), µ i,t and ν j,t , and time-invariant FE, δ i,j , for panel data, since the first two remove the time-series correlation and the third the crosssectional correlation. But this alternative has three drawbacks. The first is that the number of country dummies is unmanageable. The second is that serial correlation is only partially removed by δ i,,j ; nor can one utilize time-varying δ i,j,t because the number of country dummies would catch up with the sample size. The third is that even though δ i,j,t FE could yield unbiased estimates, the researcher would not be able to estimate the impact of important time-invariant variables (e.g., distance) on X. For this reason, Carrère (2006, 231) proposes that δ i,,j be treated as a random effect (RE). This is the procedure we will use in the empirical work. In equation (1), in addition to δ i,,j, µ i and ν j denote respectively home and host country FE, ρ t time FE and ε i,j,t a well behaved error term.
The second econometric issue arises from the presence of zero values. Zero-value observations and the fact that the log of zero is undefined make the data sample not randomly drawn. We will treat the zero-value problem in three alternative ways. The first is to change the dataset by adding one to those FDI flows that have zero-values. The second is to estimate equation (1) with a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML). Santos- Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that PPML is a superior alternative to a least square regression when errors are heterosckedastic. If the variance of these errors is correlated with the independent variables, the conditional expectation of the errors will no longer be zero and a linear regression produces biased estimates; under the same conditions, a Poisson regression produces estimates that are consistent and efficient in large samples (King, 1988) . Just as importantly for us, PPML can treat the zero-value problem. The potential drawback of PPML, on the other hand, is overdispersion, emanating from the fact that the variance cannot be set independently of the mean. For this reason, and following Burger et al. (2009), we employ the third alternative of estimating equation (1) with a zero-inflated pseudo negative binomial pseudo maximum likelihood (NBPML). Home country's FDI orientation is measured by home country's outward FDI as a percent of GDP and host country's FDI openness by inward FDI as a percent of GDP. These two variables are intended to capture policies directed at influencing unilateral FDI flows to and from partner countries because time-invariant country FE cannot capture the changes in FDI policies for both home and host countries. Their average values in the sample are, respectively, 7.5 and 6.9; their variances are six to seven times the size of the mean.
Data
Finally, we have collected standard gravity equation control variables such as geographic distance, common land border, common language, common colonial relationship, common currency, and regional trade agreement (RTA). In our sample, six percent of country-pairs share a common land border, nine percent a common language, six percent a common colonial relationship, almost three percent the same currency, and 12 percent membership in the same RTA.
As an index of the diversity of the BIT network, we employ the Jacquemin and Berry (1979) entropy measure, computed as
where S j,t is the proportion of the jth country's GDP in the total GDP of country i's BIT network in year t, and countries i and j have signed a bilateral BIT. A higher value of network diversity denotes that the network has either a larger membership or is more decentralized (diversified). If countries i and j have not signed a bilateral BIT, the value of network diversity is zero. Table 1 provides formal description and sources of each variable; Appendix A gives descriptive statistics for these variables; and Appendix B lists the 148 countries included in the data. Our dataset has 21,099 non-zero observations of FDI flows and 11,474 zero-value observations. Thus, the zero problem is a potentially serious one.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 reports the estimates of equation (1). Our specification includes year, home and host country FE and country-pair RE in line with our discussion above; standard errors of the coefficient are heteroscedastically consistent or robust. Zero-value observations are excluded and the sample size is 21,099. Column one of the table reports the estimate of the impact of BIT on FDI flows, as it is done in other studies (Neumayer and Spess, 2005 [Insert Table 2 about here]
Findings
The rest of the table explores the central issue of this paper, namely the optimality of the stock of BITs. To this end, we use three functional forms of NBIT: a linear-fit in column two, a quadratic-fit in column three, and a cubic-fit in column four. As indicated above, we distinguish between country-pairs with bilateral BITs from country-pairs that do not have them. For BIT country-pairs, the linear form of NBIT suggests that other BITs, not only contribute directly to FDI flows, but enhance the effect of bilateral BITs.
6 Furthermore, a network of BITs exerts a positive influence on FDI flows independently of whether the country-pair has signed a bilateral BIT: in fact, the orders of magnitude of the other BIT coefficient for BIT pairs and non-BIT pairs are comparable. The inference is that both horizontal and vertical integration benefit from BITs.
A MNE located in a home country with a large network of BITs may invest in a host country to maximize the benefits of the home country's BIT network (horizontal integration). A MNE located in a home country without a large network of BITs may invest in BIT-rich host country to expand sourcing and production facilities (vertical integration). Finally, a MNE may reap potentially the benefits of both horizontal and vertical integration if both countries in the pair have bilateral treaties in addition to their own BIT network. Column three of the table indicates that the coefficients of the quadratic terms of the three NBIT variables are negative and very statistically significant: incremental benefits of additional BIT are positive but declining. Figure   1 draws the total impact of BITs on bilateral FDI flows for BIT country-pairs, home-country non-BIT pairs and host-country non-BIT pairs. The resulting pattern resembles an inverted-U shaped curve, especially for non-BIT pairs. The gentle downward curvature of the BIT-pair curve reflects the strong impact of bilateral treaties on FDI flows and suggests that NBIT can still grow before their effects peak. For non-BIT pairs, the story is different and "peaking" seems to have occurred with NBIT between 80 and 100. The cubic terms of NBIT in column four are either statistically insignificant or zero at the fifth decimal. Therefore, we take the estimate from the quadratic form to be our benchmark specification.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Tests of robustness
The robustness of our findings is checked in a variety of ways; results are shown in Table 3 . First, column one of this table controls for multilateral resistance factors by employing country-pair FE instead of country-pair RE (as in Table 2 , year and country FE are also added). A necessary byproduct of this specification is that time-invariant variables, such as geographic distance, common border, common language, colonial relation and common currency, become perfectly collinear with country-pair FE and are dropped from the estimation. The coefficients of the timevarying variables are in line with those of column three of Table 3 show that the total effect of NBIT on FDI flows is strictly positive for In both cases, for BIT pairs the total effect of NBIT on FDI flows is positive but decreasing in scale. For non-BIT pairs, the impact of NBIT is mixed: positive but decreasing in scale for the home country and statistically insignificant for the host country.
In sum, our robustness checks confirm the main message of our benchmark equation: NBIT is subject to diminishing returns and its effects on FDI flows peaks.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
BIT Network Diversity as a Limiting Factor
In this section, we explore what may be the limiting factor underlying the inverted U-curve of Figure 1 . We start with the observation that economic differences within country-pairs have declined substantially over time, in contrast to what has happened to non-BIT pairs (Elkins et al., 2006) . The fact that the economic structures of new BIT partners are converging suggests that bilateral investment treaties target similar countries in preference of dissimilar countries. This pattern is consistent with investments made by horizontally integrated MNEs. But, for vertically integrated MNEs country similarities are bound to reduce incentives to sign such agreements (Elkins et al., 2006) . The natural question is whether BIT network diversity is the scarce input placing an upper limit to the marginal returns of NBIT. The answer to the question is that much will depend on the mix of horizontally and vertically integrated MNEs.
The case for corporate diversification, in products and markets, is no different than portfolio diversification (Rugman, 1979; Errunza and Senbet, 1981) : spread the risk among various activities that are less than perfectly correlated. At relatively low levels of initial diversification, a MNE may prefer to invest in a more than a less diversified economy. A country's BIT network diversity reflects those preferences. While some MNEs may focus primarily on domestic markets, diversifying MNEs will prefer to invest in countries with a high degree of diversity in their BIT network. This diversity is captured in our data by the entropy index (2), originally developed as a measure of product diversification. 7 Our network diversity is made to interact with bilateral BITs, pair's other BITs, home and home and host country NBITs.
The estimation of this specification is shown in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Network diversity interacts positively and in a statistical significant manner with bilateral investment treaties; see column one of Table 4 . BIT network diversity is attractive to foreign investors. On the other hand, the coefficient of BIT variable turns out to be insignificant, meaning that not all BITs increase FDI flows and the effect of BIT depends on the country and country pair's BIT network characteristics. In Column two, we add an interaction term between the pair's other NBIT and the pair's network diversity index instead of the quadratic term of the BIT pair's NBIT. The interaction term is negative, albeit at the 10 percent level. In Column three, two other interaction terms were added: diversity interacts with the home country's NBIT and with the host country's NBIT. Of the three interaction terms, two are significantly negative. The overall inference from the table is that network diversity plays a role in FDI flows. The interaction of diversity with different measures of NBIT mimics (or provides a justification) to some extent the quadratic term of Table 2 . As the numbers of countries in the network expands, FDI flows rise but at a diminishing rate. Figure 2 portrays an inverted U-curve in FDI flow/NBIT space computed from column three of Table 4 . The inversion of the U-curve is more delineated than those shown in Figure 1 . NBIT peaks between 40 and 60; zero FDI flow value is reached when NBIT is about 145; after that it falls into negative territory.
In sum, the diversity tests, while corroborating the findings of Table 2 , give us a plausible story underlying the diminishing returns of NBIT on FDI flows: BIT network diversity may its limiting force.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Conclusions
Our main finding is that the stock of BITs is subject to diminishing returns measured in terms of FDI flows. Diminishing returns are more pronounced among country-pairs that have not signed bilateral BITs but have their own BIT network than among country-pairs with their own bilateral BITs. The result that for a given country's BIT network, a MNE finds more value in investing where a bilateral treaty is in place may suggest either stronger property-rights protection or greater latitude to use the host country as an export platform. Our subsidiary finding is that an index of a country's BIT network diversity mimics approximately the inverted U curve underlying our main finding. We use this result as a plausible explanation of the limiting force underlying the diminishing returns of the stock of BITs in a world where there is a mix between horizontally and vertically integrated MNEs.
Our paper has also the important policy implication that decision makers in government, before signing a bilateral BIT, must analyze, not only the two countries' economic, geographic, and institutional characteristics, but also the characteristics of their own BIT network and the networks of all its trading partners. Otherwise, one runs the risk of signing a costly investment treaty without any reasonable assurance of obtaining a positive payoff.
Finally, this paper has keyed on the economic diversity of a country's BIT network as a limiting force on the effect of BITs on FDI. Future research may want to inquire on other network characteristics, such as how they impact MNE strategies concerning horizontal and vertical integration and the length and complexity of international supply chains.
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